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Abstract— The paper suggests methods to the assessment of 
information risks, which makes the transition from a qualitative 
assessment of information risks (according to the factor analysis 
of information risks methodology) to a quantitative assessment. 
The development factor analysis of information risks 
methodology of the methodology was carried out using the 
mathematical apparatus of probability theory, namely Bayesian 
networks. A comparative analysis of the standard factor analysis 
of information risks methodology and the developed 
methodology using statistical data was carried out. During the 
analysis, the cause and effect relationships of the confidentiality 
violation have been formed, defined and given in the 
corresponding table and in the form of the Ishikawa diagram. 
As an example, it was calculated the amount of risk the company 
may be exposed to in case of violation of information 
confidentiality according to the standard factor analysis of 
information risks methodology and the developed methodology. 
It is shown that the use of proposed technique allows quantifying 
the risk assessment that can be obtained using the factor analysis 
of information risks methodology. 
Keywords—information security, risk assessment, threat, 
vulnerability, asset, quantitative analysis   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, information is transmitted and 
stored in infocommunication systems and is the most 
valuable product. The main component of 
infocommunication systems is the information protection 
system (IPS), from the correct functioning of which the 
security of information components depends. Method for 
ensuring the continuity of the IPS provides a stage of 
information security risk management [1]. Risk is an event 
that can cause loss or damage. Risk assessment is a 
process, as a result of which the damage or loss is 
determined in quantitative or qualitative terms [2].  
In information security, risk assessment is a way of 
making decisions. The most common decision is the rationale 
for the costs of implementing a product to protect 
information. Protection is implemented, in order to avoid 
damage to valuable assets [3]. Prevention of damage occurs 
by neutralizing risks (through the implementation and 
management of measures and protective equipment). Risk 
assessment and management processes are the foundation for 
building the information security management system 
(ISMS) of organization. The effectiveness of these processes 
is determined by the accuracy and completeness of the 
analysis and risk assessment, as well as the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms used in the organization to make managerial 
decisions and control their implementation. 
The processes of creating, constructing, 
implementation, operation, monitoring and improvement of 
ISMS presented both in international standards [3] (for 
example, the ISO/IEC 27000 standards line), as well as the 
development of well-known companies, for example: IT-
Grundschutz, ISACA, etc.  
However, the analysis of standards in the field of 
information security has shown that they do not clearly 
indicate the way in which these procedures should be 
carried out. That is, they do not give a concrete answer to 
what kind of methodology for risk assessment should be 
used. As a rule, this task is assigned to the heads of 
enterprises or persons responsible for the implementation 
and support of the ISMS. Thus, the task of selecting 
(developing) a methodology for assessing information 
risks, with its simplicity and visibility, the reliability of the 
results obtained with the help of it is an extremely 
important scientific and practical task [4, 5]. 
The aim of the work is to develop a methodology for 
quantifying information risks based on the methodology of 
factor analysis of information risks. 
II. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS 
Today, there are a wide variety of methods for 
assessing information risks [6, 7]. The most commonly 
used methods are: 
• quantitative methods (the risk is estimated through a 
numerical value, for example, the amount of 
expected annual losses); 
• methods that use risk assessment at a qualitative 
level (for example, on a scale of "high", "medium", 
"low"); 
• methodologies using mixed estimates. 
A. Quantitative method 
Quantitative risk assessment is used in situations where 
the threats and associated risks can be compared with the 
  
final quantitative values expressed in money, percentages, 
time, human resources, and so on. The method allows to 
obtain specific values of risk assessment objects when 
implementing threats to information security. In a 
quantitative approach, all elements of risk assessment are 
assigned specific and real quantitative values. The 
algorithm for obtaining these values should be clear and 
understandable. The object of valuation can be the value of 
the asset in monetary terms, the likelihood of the threat, the 
damage from the implementation of the threat, the cost of 
protective measures, and so on. 
B. Qualitative method 
Because of the large uncertainty, it is not always 
possible to obtain a specific expression of the object of 
evaluation. In this case, a qualitative method is used. 
Qualitative approach does not use quantitative or monetary 
expressions for the object of evaluation. Instead, the 
evaluation object is assigned an indicator ranked by a three-
point (low, medium, high), five-point or ten-point scale (0 ... 
10). To collect data with a qualitative risk assessment, 
questioning of target groups, interviewing, questioning, 
personal meetings are used. The analysis of information 
security risks by a qualitative method should be conducted 
with the involvement of employees with experience and 
competence in that area in which threats are addressed. 
The aim of both approaches is to understand the real 
risks of the company's information security, to determine 
the list of current threats, and to select effective 
countermeasures and means of protection. [8, 9]. Each 
approach to risk assessment has advantages and 
disadvantages. The quantitative method provides a visual 
representation in the money for the objects of evaluation 
(damage, costs), however it is more laborious and in some 
cases is not applicable. 
A qualitative method allows to perform a risk 
assessment faster, but the estimates and results are more 
subjective and do not provide a clear picture of the damage, 
costs and benefits of implementing ISMS [10]. It should be 
noted that at this time, the main approaches to information 
technology risk management are based on the requirements 
of the Information Management and Audit Standard Cobit 
v.5.0; Risk Management Guidelines for Information 
Technology NIST 800-30; ISO / IEC 27000 and ISO / IEC 
31000 series standards [3], BSI-Standards from IT-
Grundschutz, etc. The next methods are usually used 
directly for risk assessment: the method of assessing 
operational-critical threats; Operationally critical threats, 
assets and vulnerability evaluation (OCTAVE); 
Methodology for Risk Assessment by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST); Risk Analysis and 
Management Method (CRAMM) and others. Recently 
increasing attention is paid to the method of factor analysis 
of information risks (FAIR), which provides the most 
complete consideration of the factors of information risks 
[4]. The analysis of known methods carried out by the 
authors showed that each method has both advantages and 
certain disadvantages. 
From the companies management point of view the 
main disadvantages considered methods are the provision 
of a qualitative (but not quantitative) assessment, that does 
not give a specific risk value, with which the leaders of 
organizations could work (only approximate values are 
given, the range of which is quite variable and is indicated 
in the corresponding scales used) and taking into account 
the insufficient number of factors influencing the risk 
assessment. 
Consider the main approaches of the FAIR 
methodology. This method is based on the analysis of 
factors that affect the various components of risk. 
According to this technique, first of all, the risk depends on 
frequency of occurrence of the incident and the probably 
losses of its occurrence and based on a cause-effect 
analysis. Cause-effect analysis is a combination of analysis 
of the "tree" of faults (causes) and the "tree" of events 
(effects), which is used to analyze complex problems that 
depend on a variety of reasons. A key aspect is the 
application of a cause-effect diagram, otherwise known as 
Ishikawa's Diagram. 
The advantages of this approach are as follows: at the 
same time allows to analyze different categories of causes 
of the problem; encourages creativity when brainstorm; 
provides a visualized structured presentation of the causes 
of the complex problem; this method is used to analyze 
various ways of developing events that could take place in 
the system after a critical event, depending on the 
functioning of specific subsystems (for example, 
emergency systems). If these methods are quantified, they 
represent an estimate of the probability of the various 
possible consequences of a critical event. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
We will carry out a transition from a qualitative 
assessment of information risks (by the method of FAIR) 
to quantitative assessment. At the same time, we will take 
into account the requirements of the international standard 
ISO / IEC 27001: 2013, as the most relevant in the field of 
information security. This transition involves selection of 
an asset for which a risk assessment will be carried out. 
Note that as an asset, anyone for which the risk assessment 
is carried out can be selected. In the work as an asset, the 
authors considered a file containing confidential 
information (restricted access information) and located on 
the computer. 
In accordance with the standard ISO/IEC 27001:2013, 
the violation of information security (IS) is a violation of 
confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A) of 
information, at this stage determine: 
• possible events leading to a violation of C, I, A. 
Note that the definition of these events must be 
carried out separately for each of the IS properties, 
that is, separately for C, I, A; 
• determines at what expense this event may occur; 
• determines the reasons that may lead to these 
events. 
The results of the second stage for the formation and 
determination of cause-effect relationships should be 
placed in the appropriate tables or in the form of Ishikawa 
graphs for each of the properties IS: C, I, A. 
It should be noted that when forming the corresponding 
tables, it is necessary to consider both the elements of the 
FAIR method and the requirements of the standard 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [3], that are: possible event and its 
   
 
probability is equal to contact; conditional probability of 
occurrence of an event is equal to action; causes that give 
rise to hypotheses and the relevant paragraph of the 
standard ISO/IEC 27001:2013 is equal to level control; 
through which the event can happen (hypothesis) and its 
probability is equal to possibilities threat. Together with the 
reasons, which lead to the emergence of hypotheses, it is 
advisable to refer to relevant paragraphs of ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 [3]. These are elements and mechanisms that 
need to be implemented in the organization to effectively 
ensure the information security. 
The next step provides for the definition of probabilities 
for implementing hypotheses and conditional probabilities 
of events occurrence (columns 2 and 4 of Table 1, 
respectively). These probabilities are obtained based on a 
priori known statistical data of analytical companies that 
are professional in this field and relevant decisions of the 
company's experts. Thus, the data shown in the table allow 
us to calculate the probability of realizing threats through 
specific vulnerabilities. 
Consider the events that can lead to violation of 
confidentiality, integrity or accessibility of information. 
Obviously, they are independent, that is, the appearance of 
one of these events does not affect the appearance of 
another. In the presented table, these events are listed in the 
"Possible event and its probability" column. The 
implementation of any of these events (factors) leads to 
loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of 
information with a probability P. 
Based on the theorem, that the probability of occurrence 
of at least one of the events, independent in the aggregate, is 
equal to the difference between unity and product of 
probabilities opposite events [11], we obtain the expression 
1
1 (1 ( ))
n
i
i
P P А
=
= − − , where n is the number of events 
that may violate confidentiality, integrity or availability; i 
is a current event number; )( iАP  is probability of 
realization of the event. 
It is advisable to take into account the fact that the 
realization of the events of iА  also depends on a number of 
factors (or hypotheses). Let's mark their probabilities of 
implementation through )( ijHP . They are also 
independent of each other in the same event. Denote by 
( )i ijP A H  the conditional probability of occurrence of the 
event iА  under the condition of the j -th hypothesis. Then, 
based on the formula of the complete probability and the 
formula of adding probabilities [11], we obtain the 
expression 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
n m
i ij i iji j
P А P H P A H
= =
=  , 
where i is the current event number, the j is current 
hypothesis number, the n is the number of appropriate 
events, m is a number of hypotheses. Thus, the application 
of the above formulas will give the value of the 
probabilities of confidentiality violations, integrity and 
availability separately. The expected value of the loss 
amount can be calculated by the formula: 
1
n
i i ii
R P E
=
=  , where iR  is probability of violation of 
C, I, A; iE  is the size of losses from the onset of these 
events. 
The Ishikawa diagram allows to identify and 
systematize various factors and conditions that affect the 
assessment of the risk of confidentiality violation (Fig.1). 
The table representation of active (file located on local 
host) is presented in Table 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Possible causes on Ishikawa diagram 
IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED METHOD 
As part of the study, the authors conducted a 
comparative analysis of the standard FAIR risk assessment 
methodology and the developed approach using the 
statistics provided by leading companies to assess the 
threats to information security. As an asset, a file with 
confidential information was considered. The actions that 
could damage the company were considered by the attacker 
to violate the privacy, integrity and availability of the 
information stored in this file. According to the FAIR 
methodology, the risk is the product of the probabilistic 
frequency of insured events and the probable value of 
possible losses. As noted above, the risk on the asset is the 
products sum of the probability values of violation of 
confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information on 
the amount of possible damage from the onset of these 
events. As an example, the magnitude of risk was 
calculated, which the company may experience in case of 
violation of the confidentiality of information. After 
establishing all the necessary data ( )iP А , we calculated 
total probability of violation of the confidentiality P , the 
losses that can be incurred by the company in violation of 
the confidentiality of information Ekonf. To do this, we 
will estimate the amount of loss in case of violation of the 
confidentiality of information for each form of loss. As 
noted it possible to take into account the loss as the sum of 
losses for all types of damage. Risk of confidentiality R  
calculate according to the formula (1). Thus, in accordance 
with the proposed methodology, the quantitative risk value 
for an asset was obtained in case of violation of its 
confidentiality. According to the standard method, we can 
say that the risk is average, based on the low frequency of 
events that lead to losses (between 1-0.1 times a year) and 
the average probable value of losses (between 1000 and 
10000 USD). 
  
TABLE I.  SOME EVENTS THAT MAY BE CAUSE A VIOLATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
Possible event and 
its probability 
Р(А1і) 
Due to what the event 
(hypothesis) and its probability 
may occur, Р(Н1іj) 
The reasons for the hypothesis and the 
corresponding paragraph of the standard 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
Conditional probability of occurrence of an 
event, Р(А1і|Н1іj) 
Violation of the 
confidentiality of 
information due to 
imperfection of 
physical 
protection Р(А11) 
Overcoming an intruder 
perimeter of the enterprise 
security zone 
P(Н111) 
Insufficient effectiveness of measures aimed at 
ensuring the physical protection of the 
perimeter, building, windows and doors, 
(А.11.1) 
Violation of the confidentiality of information 
when overcoming the perimeter of the security 
zone of the enterprise, Р(А11|Н111) 
Failure of an enterprise policy 
"clean table", P(Н112) 
Failure to comply with clean desktop and 
screen policies, negligent attitude to the 
preservation of documents with restricted 
access, (А.11.2.9) 
Violation of confidentiality at the failure of an 
enterprise policy "clean table", Р(А11|Н112) 
Violation of 
confidentiality by 
not effectively 
control access 
Р(А12) 
Getting an attacker to access 
restricted information due to 
incorrectly configured host 
privileges, Р(Н121) 
There is not enough effective policy to delimit 
the access to the local host, (А.9.2, А.9.4) 
Violation of the confidentiality of information 
when an attacker receives access to restricted 
information due to improperly configured host 
privileges. Р(А12|Н121) 
Realization of password 
hacking, Р(Н122) 
Insufficiently effective password management 
system (easy guessing passwords, insufficient 
frequent replacement), (А.9.4.3) 
Violation of confidentiality at hacking 
password protection, Р(А12|Н122) 
Removing the restricted 
information from removable 
storage, Р(Н123) 
Insufficient effectiveness of measures aimed at 
ensuring the safe operation of removable 
storage, (А.8.3) 
Violation of confidentiality while removing the 
restricted information from removable storage, 
Р(А12|Н123) 
Bribery of employees by an 
attacker, Р(Н124) 
Bribery of employees, (А.7) Violation of confidentiality at bribing 
employees of the organization, Р(А12|Н124) 
Unintentional harm of 
employees, Р(Н125) 
Unintentional destructive actions of 
employees, (А.7) 
Violation of confidentiality at the unintended 
harm the organization's staff, Р(А12|Н125) 
 
Thus, the risk value obtained with the proposed method 
falls within the range of the probable loss value, which is 
determined by the standard approach. However, unlike a 
qualitative assessment of the FAIR technique, the resulting 
risk value is quantitative, which allows more efficiently 
predict the costs of information security. 
It should be noted that when calculating the developed 
methodology it is necessary to respond responsibly to the 
process of threats identification and the reasons for their 
occurrence (see Table 1), and take into account company 
and analytical agencies statistics. If necessary, use the 
experts services. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed approach to the assessment of 
information risks is based on the concept of the FAIR 
technique, taking into account the requirements of the 
international standard ISO/IEC 27001:2013, as the most 
current in the field of information security, and allows 
quantifying the risk assessment that can be obtained 
through the qualitative method of FAIR. The methodology 
was developed using the mathematical apparatus of 
probability theory, namely Baesian networks. To determine 
the risk, a causal-effect analysis was used. 
The results of the work should be used to quantify the 
information risks in various companies and organizations 
that create or operate the SMB. Further development of 
work should be research aimed at increasing the level of 
expert information used in the stage of determining the 
likelihood of the implementation of hypotheses and 
conditional probabilities of occurrence of events. 
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